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on the basis that Parliament occupies the field and then interpret s.
221 (4) as strictly as the court deems necessary.
DAVID M. BEATTY.'
CRIMINAL LAW
Regina v. MacDonald and Mt. Pleasant (B.C. 177) Branch of Royal
Canadian Legion, [1966] S.C.R. 3; 47 C.R. 37.
CRIMINAL LAW-COMMON GAMING HOUSE-EXEMPTION FOR BONA FIDE
SOCIAL CLUB UNDER S. 168 (2) (a).
The Supreme Court of Canada1 was recently faced with an in-
stance of contemporary morality-bingo games and the social club
exemption to keeping a common gaming house. The court dealt with
the issue in a rather narrow and summary fashion,2 and seemed to go
beyond even the Victorian attitudes which originally fostered such
legislation.
The respondents were charged under s. 176 of the Criminal Code
with keeping a common gaming house; they were convicted by the
magistrate but acquitted on appeal to the British Columbia Court of
Appeal.3 Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted on the
issue of the nature of the exemption contained in s. 168 (2) (a) of the
Criminal Code.
The relevant parts of the section read:
168(2) A place is not a common gaming house...(a) While it is occupied and used by an incorporated bonw fide social club
or branch thereto if(i) the whole or any portion of the bets on or proceeds from games
played therein is not directly or indirectly paid to the keeper
thereof, and
0i) no fee in excess of ten cents an hour or fifty cents a day is
charged to persons for the right or privilege of participating in
the games played therein.
The facts were not in dispute. Branch 177, of which MacDonald
was Secretary-Manager, is an incorporated branch of the Royal
Canadian Legion. The branch occupied three floors of a building,
two floors being used only by Legion members. The first floor was
used for bingo games, twice a day, six days a week. The daily paid
attendance at these games averaged 1,800 persons.
Any person who wished to play bingo was admitted, without
restriction, upon payment of a fifty cent fee. However, in order to
* David M. Beatty, B.A. (Toronto) is a second year student at Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1 [1966J S.C.R. 3. Present were Taschereau, C.J. and Fauteux, Martland,
Judson and Hall J.J. The judgment was delivered by Judson, J. for the court.2 A three and a quarter page judgment citing no cases.
3 Unreported. No. 531/64. Oral judgment of Norris, J.A. for court. Present
Nouss, Bull, and Sullivan, JJ.A.
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participate in the prize money, a payment of a further fifty cents was
required. Although it was possible to play bingo without this further
payment and without therefore the right to participate in the prize
money, no one ever did. Branch 177 retained only the fifty cent
admission fee; all other monies received were returned on the same
day as prizes for lucky participants.
The Supreme Court found the respondents guilty of keeping a
common gaming house. Branch 177 was held not to fall under the
social club exemption of s. 168 (2) (a) because
(i) the court did not consider it to be a bona fide social club,(ii) the proceeds from games played were paid to the keeper,(iii) a fee of more than fifty cents a day was levied against persons
playing, and(iv) the persons playing were not "persons" allowed by the social club
exemption.
(1) Definition of Bona Fides
It was held that the premises were not being used as a bona fide
social club, because the premises were open to the public without
discrimination and were in daily use as a centre of public gambling.
It was unnecessary to inquire into the objects of the Canadian Legion
or of its incorporated Branch, because the use of these premises on
such a widespread scale was said to contradict any possible inference
of use as a bona fide social club.
However, in considering who are persons who may play, the
court held that "persons" are those who play bingo in premises while
used by a social club in a bona fide manner.
Because of the circular relationship between issues one and four,
this problem of bona fides will be discussed in detail later under the
general question of who are "persons" who may play.
(2) Proceeds Paid to the Keeper
The court, interpreting s.168 (2) (a) (i), held that the whole or any
portion of the bets or proceeds from the game were directly or in-
directly paid to the keeper. Subsection 2 was formerly part of s. 226
of the old Criminal Code.4 Under that section a conviction was quashed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bampton v. R.5 The charge was
in respect of a club interested in assisting certain team sports, but
also providing tables for poker, for which each member paid into the
club's funds ten cents for each half-hour of play. In the words of
Duff, J., (as he then was) :6
My mind is clear upon this point, namely that the payment of this fee
is not a payment 'of the whole or any portion of stakes or bets, or other
proceeds at or from the games' . . . I think we are justified in saying
that .... it (the word 'proceeds') . .. is limited to the proceeds of a
gambling or betting game as such, and proceeds similar in character to
bets and stakes ... The section is aimed, I think, at the participation by
the owner of the place where the game is carried on, in the profits or
other proceeds accruing to the members from the game itself.
The court in MacDonald did not refer to its previous decision in
Bampton; in fact the court in MacDonald referred to no cases what-
4 R.S.C. 1937, c. 36.
5 (1932) 58 C.C.C. 289; [19321 S.C.R. 626.6 [19321 S.C.R. 626, 628.
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soever. Applying Duff J.'s interpretation of "proceeds" to the further
fifty cents fee paid to participate in the prize money in MacDonald,
there is no violation of this particular requirement because all of this
money was redistributed as prizes. Nor would the admission charge
be caught under this definition.
In the Bampton decision, Anglin, J. quotes with specific approval7
the statement of Beck, J.A. in R. v. Cherry and Long.8
This clause refers only to a payment made to the keeper out of one or
all of the 'pots' under a rule or regulation, agreement or understanding
exacted by the keeper that such a payment shall be made.
These cases admittedly considered s. 226 (1) (ii) of the old Code,
and their present authority may not be clear in view of the enactment
of section 168(2) (a) (i) in 1938. However, it is submitted that since
these cases are conceived with the interpretation of the words "the
whole or any portion of the stakes or proceeds at or from the game",
they should have been referred to by the court in MacDonald. If they
had been referred to it is difficult to see how the decision on this
ground could stand.
The court determined the issue of payment here not on the
ultimate disposition of the money but on the simple fact of payment
to the keeper. Although all monies were paid directly to the keeper,
it retained only the admission fees and distributed all of the further
fifty cent fee on the same day in the form of prizes. This further
fee was paid to the keeper only as an expedient. The language of the
subsection suggests a more tenable explanation would be that the
money must not only be paid to, but also retained by the keeper to
infringe this requirement. The ultimate disposition of the proceeds
should be the relevant and crucial determination.
The court refused to consider the separate nature of the two
different fifty cent charges. It is submitted that the charge for ad-
mission should be considered under s. 168(2) (a) (ii) (fifty cents per
day), while the additional charge for prizes should only be considered
under s. 168 (2) (a) (i) (proceeds paid to keeper).
(3) A charge in excess of fifty cents per day
The court found that more than fifty cents per day was charged
to persons for the right to participate in the game. The court insists
that it is impossible to break down what they paid into charge for
admission and a further separate charge for the right to participate
in the prize money. Just why this is impossible, the court does not
indicate. With respect, it would seem that this is not impossible on
a reasonable interpretation of subsection 2(a) (ii). The additional
fifty cents was optional; the further payment was only for participa-
tion in the prize money. One could play the game only by paying the
fifty cent admission charge. Thus, only fifty cents a day was charged
"for the right of participating in games played therein." 9 The fact that
everyone paid the additional fifty cents ought not to prejudice the
7 [1932J S.C.R. 626, 633.
8 (1924) 42 C.C.C. 137, at 141.
9 As per Criminal Code, 1953-54, S.C., c. 51, s. 168(2) (a) (ii).
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court against the respondents. The question should not be whether
the separate charges are only made for the purpose of paying lip
service to the Code, but rather: did the charges considered separately
satisfy the requirements of the Code?
Because the Code deals with them separately, the admission
charge being regulated by s. 168(2) (a) (ii), and participation in pro-
ceeds by s. 168(2) (a) (i), it should be clear there are two separate
requirements. If each separate charge satisfies its particular require-
ments, then this should be sufficient.
Of course this interpretation would allow gambling in a club
where one pays fifty cents for entrance and then may gamble for any
amount, provided the keeper does not get a "rake-off". However,
nothing in this subsection, on a normal reading, precludes this. Nor
should the courts construct a contrary interpretation. Criminal Code
provisions are construed narrowly so that men, with some degree of
certainty, may order their affairs, based on an ordinary and literal
reading of the Code. As long as the Code requires a social club to be
bona ftde (in keeping with the submissions below under that head)
in order to permit gambling on its premises, then the court need not
fear this result. It seems that the court considered the charges to-
gether here because of policy considerations. Whatever these may be,
the court neither alludes to there being any policy nor declares what
this policy is.
(4) Who are "persons" who may play under Subsection 2(a)(ii)?
It was held in MacDonald that "persons" in this context meant
persons who play bingo on the premises while used by a social club
in a bona fide manner in keeping with the objects for which it was
incorporated. The Supreme Court thus overruled the British Columbia
Court of Appeal 10 who had held that "persons" here means "persons
in general".
The British Columbia Court had held that to restrict the mean-
ing of the word "persons" would be contrary to the intention of
Parliament. Intention is to be gathered from the words of the legisla-
tion and there is nothing in this section to show the word "persons"
was not to have its ordinary meaning as found in the dictionaries or
in the interpretation section of the Code. The British Columbia Court
found support for accepting the ordinary meaning from the use of the
word "persons" in other parts of s. 168, where clearly the ordinary
meaning must be applied.
The Supreme Court would limit "persons" to persons on premises
while being used by a social club in a bona fide manner. But the use
of the premises for bingo on such a widespread scale was said to
contradict any possible inference of bona fides. The court does not
make it clear whether widespread use refers to the number of games
played or to the fact that the public at large were invited to play.
The court should go beyond the facts of frequent use and being open
to the public to determine whether the club was acting in a bona fide
manner or not. The court should consider whether the acts complained
10 Unreported. B.C.C.A. No. 531/64.
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of are within the objects for which the club was incorporated. The
frequency of games is really only one factor, and should not preclude
consideration of other factors, such as the objects of the Legion, and
whether the admission fees collected by the Legion go towards ful-
filling these objects.
It has been recently held in 1. v. Pon Chung et all that a social
club does not lose its bona fide status simply because all objects of
its charter are not carried out or because it is operated for gain. The
fact non-members may enter and participate without challenge did
not, by itself, in that case, deprive such a club of its status. Thus,
the approach taken by the magistrate to the problem of bona fides
seems more logical and realistic than that employed by the Supreme
Court in MacDonald.
Beyond mere Statutory Interpretation
The Supreme Court in MacDonald refused to inquire into the
question of bona fides because of the widespread scale of the games.
The decision seems to reflect certain unexpressed notions of public
policy.
Section 168 (2) (a), in its ordinary meaning, does not use language
restricting the social club exemption to occasional use. Subsection 2 (b)
does refer to frequency of operation, but only with respect to the
exemption for charitable institutions, and this is neither material
nor at issue here. By narrowly interpreting the exemption as they did,
the court has, in fact, added a new requirement to the criteria for
exemption from the common gaming house.
In interpreting the section as they did, the court has made more
strict a law to which the public is unsympathetic and one which is
not being effectively enforced now. Bingo games seem to be growing
in popularity; more important, public acceptance of these games is
also expanding. It is not suggested that unpopular laws should neces-
sarily be revoked, but it seems that narrowing the social club exemp-
tion in relation to bingo games is out of tune with present attitudes
towards gambling. The interpretation here is now so narrow as to
distort the section itself.
One wonders what the intention of Parliament was in this area.
There is no judicial discussion of legislative intent in any of the cases
reported under this section. Presumably, Parliament considered
gambling a social evil and decided to restrict it in order to protect the
individual and society from its due consequences. However, it is
significant that Parliament did not make gambling per se a crime, but
restricted the circumstances within which it will be permitted. 12
Section 168, in effect, restores those rights taken away by the general
prohibition in section 176, if certain conditions are complied with.
The British Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries, and Gam-
ing,13 in examining the admittedly more liberal British gaming laws,
considered that the object of such legislation should be to interfere
11 [1965] 1 O.R. 583; [19653 2 C.C.C. 381 (Magistrates' Court). [1966] 1
O.R. 379 (Ont. C.A.).
12 Criminal Code, 1953-54 S.C., c. 51, s. 176.
13 1949-51 Cmd. 8190, para. 186.
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as little as possible with individual liberty to take part in various
forms of gambling, but to impose such restrictions as are desirable
and practicable to discourage or prevent excess. This is far too en-
lightened to have been the Canadian Parliament's intention in this
area. But just what was that intention? At the very least, the court
should have discussed what they imagined Parliament's intention
to be.
Possible Policy considerations underlying Judgment
What are the unmentioned policy considerations which may be
influencing the court's decision here? Possibly the court feared that
bingo will fall into the hands of professional gamblers. But does this
fear justify the consideration of a bona fide social club, if it operates
within the restriction of s. 168(2) (a)? It is submitted that the re-
quirements of bona fides should be determined not by frequency of
use, but in relation to the objects and whether these objects are
carried out. To eliminate professional bingo game operators seeking
to profit by the social club exemption, the court could go beyond a
consideration of the objects and determine if the proceeds were
actually spent in pursuit of several of those objects.
Perhaps the court feels that bingo games are morally degrading
and that they will corrupt anyone who participates. It is true that
bingo is the outcome of a wager determined by chance alone without
exercise of skill on part of bettor and as such is clearly a form of
gambling,14 albeit an unsophisticated one. However, there do not
appear to be any great social evils that are promulgated by bingo
playing. If this fear of moral corruption is influencing the court, let
them so declare it.
Conclusion
It would appear that the court exceeded its authority in determin-
ing the issue under the guide lines of s. 168. It is for the Legislature
to expand or restrict the s. 168 exemption and to control gambling.
The courts' function here is to interpret the legislation; in this case
the Supreme Court has gone beyond mere interpretation and has in
effect substantially changed the Legislature's enactment.
Recommended Legislative Changes Relating to Bingo
(1) The limits of the permissible fee to be charged by a bona fide
social club should be raised. This would rectify a considerable
number of infringements and engender new respect for the law.
The present limitation on the amount of the fee 16 was introduced
in the Code in 1938.17 Prior to that time, a bona fide (members)
club might lawfully charge such a fee as appeared to them to be
proper. It is time to re-assess the amount of the maximum allow-
able in terms of a realistic figure for the late 1960's.
14 Criminal Code, 1953-54 S.C., c. 51, s. 168(1) (f).
15 A.-G.'s Committee on Law Relating to Gambling. Tabled in Legislature
Nov. 23/61. Chairman J. D. Morton.
16 Criminal Code, 1953-54 S.C., c. 51, s. 168(2) (a) (i) and (ii).
17 1938, c. 44, s. 12.
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(2) It is clear that a large number of bingo games are held which
do not fall within the statutory exemption. These attract con-
siderable public support. The law should be amended so as to
permit a licensing system to be set up under which permits may
be granted for the operation of a limited number of such games
for specified purposes under statutory controls. Such controls
could involve the giving of price limits and submission of audited
accounts to a licensing body.
LAWRENCE D. ZALDIN1'
Regina v. Carker.
CRIMINAL LAW-WILFUL DAMAGE-DURESS.
Only a hypocritical society would condemn a defendant for yielding to
force that the rest of its members would have been unable to resist.1
These words become particularly appropriate in light of the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Carker,2 where an
accused's plea of duress was not accepted as a defence to a finding
of wilful damage to public property.3 The words emphasize the broad
range of prohibited conduct which our courts consider punishable
despite the presence of extenuating circumstances; and they embody
an underlying concept of justice which has never apparently been
incorporated in our law. In an area where previous judicial scrutiny
has been negligible,4 and despite the evolution of various alternative
approaches to the problem,5 it is disturbing in this case that the
Supreme Court, without the slightest deference to the origins of the
legislation, should so narrowly confine the language of the Criminal
Code, as was done here.
I
The accused in R. v. Carker was a penitentiary inmate who had
damaged the plumbing fixtures in his cell during a protest disturbance.
Initially, the accused had refrained from taking part in the agitation.
* Lawrence D. Zaldin is a second year student at Osgoode Hall Law
School.
1 64 COLum. L. Rsv. 1469 at 1506.
2 R. V. Carker, unreported decision of Supreme Court of Canada. Thejudgment, pronounced on December 19, 1966, was written by Ritchie J.
3 Criminal Code, 1953-54 S.C., c. 51, s. 372(3).
4 Reference to the absence of decided law or discussion concerning duress
is probably the most common remark made about the topic: See Edwards,J. L1. J., Compulsion, Coercion, and Crimina Responsibility, 14 MOD. L.R. 297,
at 297. In Canada, the limited range of the very few decisions on duress
indicates the same: Dunbar v. The King, (1936) 67 C.C.C. 20 (S.C.C.); Rex v.
Farduto, 10 D.L.R. 669 (Que. K.B.-Appellate Division).
5 A discussion of legislation in 20 of the U.S. States gives some idea of
the variations that might be used in interpreting or amending our own legis-
lation: MODEL PENA CODE § 2.09, (Aammec LAw INsTiTuTE), (Tent. Draft
No. 10). Other Commonwealth Codes are also discussed in HowARD, C.,
A-usTRAww CRmuv= LAw at 365-66.
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However, during the demonstrations, other prisoners threatened the
accused's physical well-being if he did not join them by breaking up
the furnishings in his own cell. Shouting in unison from their separate
cells, the other prisoners warned that unless he participated in the
disturbance he would be kicked in the head, his arm would be broken
and he would get a knife in the back at the first opportunity.
At trial the accused admitted the damage he had done to the
plumbing fixtures. However, he argued for acquittal on two counts.
First, his conduct did not fall within the definition of "wilful" in
s. 371(1) of the Criminal Code; 6 alternatively, he acted under com-
pulsion 7 and was therefore entitled to be excused under the pro-
visions of s. 17 of the Criminal Code,8 or the common law defence of
"duress". The trial judge dismissed both of the accused's arguments,
defining "wilfully" as no more than a man's intending the natural
and probable consequences of his voluntary acts,9 and limiting the
defence of duress to the language of s. 17, which he said did not include
the type of threats the accused proposed to bring forth in evidence. 0
The British Columbia Court of Appeal," MacLean, J.A. dissent-
ing, reversed the decision of the lower court. The majority of the
court, as shall be discussed, narrowed the definition of "wilful" and
extended the circumstances in which s. 17 might apply, although
never to the extent that a separate common law defence of duress
was recognized. The Supreme Court of Canada, apparently unim-
pressed with the majority's reasoning in the Court of Appeal, restored
the conviction. Ritchie J., delivering the judgment, agreed with
both lower courts in suggesting duress had been codified and exhaus-
tively defined in s. 17. However, in reference to the accused's plea
under s. 17, he adopted the logic of the trial court:
... although these threats were "immediate" in the sense that they
were continuous, they were not threats of "immediate death" or "imme-
diate grievous bodily harm" and none of the persons who delivered
them was present in the cell with the [accused] when the offence was
committed.' 2
6 Criminal Code, 1953-54 S.C., c. 51, s. 371(1): Everyone who causes the
occurrence of an event by doing an act or omitting to do an act that it is his
duty to do, knowing that the act or omission will probably cause the occur-
rence of the event and being reckless whether the event occurs or not, shall
be deemed, for the purposes of this Part, wilfully to have caused the occur-
rence of the event.
7 The words compulsion and coercion are sometimes used to describe
duress. To a certain extent they are interchangeable, although they more
appropriately describe various forms of duress. See EDWARDS, supra, footnote 4
at 297.
s Criminal Code, 1953-54 S.C., c. 51, s. 17: A person who commits an
offence under compulsion by threats of immediate death or grievous bodily
harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed is excused
for committing the offence if he believes that the threats will be carried out
and if he is not a party to a conspiracy or association whereby he is subject
to compulsion, but this section does not apply where the offence that is com-
mitted is treason, murder, piracy, attempted murder, assisting in rape, forcible
abduction, robbery, causing bodily harm or arson.
9 (1966) 56 W.W.R. 65, at 73.10 At trial, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of evidence
which the accused proposed to introduce to prove he acted under duress. The
trial judge decided the evidence was inadmissible.
11 Supra, footnote 9.
12 Supra, footnote 2.
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On this basis the court refused to admit evidence tendered by the
accused to establish duress. Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the
accused's contention that his conduct was not "wilful" within the
meaning of s. 371 (1), saying:
... there is no suggestion in the evidence tendered for the defence that
the accused did not know that what he was doing would probably cause
damage.13
II
Before dealing with duress and the interpretation of s. 17, con-
sideration should be given to the offence itself and the crucial element
of wilfulness. In each court a different meaning is attributed to
"wilful" in s. 371(1), although not always with different results. 14
And yet, the Supreme Court did not consider it necessary to elaborate
on the issue beyond what was said above.15 This leaves several
pertinent questions unanswered. Does "wilful" as defined in s. 371 (1)
extend or alter the meaning that courts ordinarily 6 give the word? 17
If so, is there any significance in the offence of damage to public
property, or any of the other offences under Part IX of the Criminal
Code, which would warrant a peculiar interpretation of "wilful"?18
What does "reckless" mean? Is it an additional requirement necessary
to prove wilfulness, or a separate alternative to knowledge of
"probable damage"?
In the Carker decision the Supreme Court's interpretation of
"wilful" has substantially reduced the mental ingredient of mens rea
necessary to convict the accused in this case. Presumably the conduct
of any individual with normal mental capacity will fall within the
court's definition of "wilfully", regardless of his intention. Criminal
responsibility, based solely on the accused's carrying out the aotus
reus, is well recognized in principle, but less frequently applied. A
court, tending toward such liability by minimizing the element of
mens rea, should not approach the matter casually.
13 Ibid.
14 At trial and in the Supreme Court of Canada the accused was said to
have been guilty of damage to public property. However, the reasoning of
the two courts seems to differ slightly. In the lower court, where "wilful" is
interpreted as a man's intending the natural and probable consequences of
his act, one could suggest that this is no more than a presumption of the
accused's intention (R. v. Steane, [1947] 1 All E.R. 813), which might easily
be rebutted. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, would seem to have estab-
lished nothing more than a requirement of mens rea by its interpretation of
"wilful". In fact, the trial judge allowed evidence in an attempt to establish
an absence of "wilfulness", whereas the Supreme Court would not have
heard it.
Is Supra, footnote 2.
16 The word "wilfully" is ordinarily used in the criminal sense to desig-
nate bad motive or purpose or evil intention (Rex v. Goodman, 99 C.C.C. 366).
That is, not merely to commit an act voluntarily, but to commit it purposely
with an evil intention (ex parte O'Shaughnessy, 8 C.C.C. 136). See also: Rex
v. Griffin, 63 C.C.C. 286 (N.B.C.A.).
17 MARTIN'S CREVIINAL CODE 1955 at 70: For the purposes of Part IX It
(wilful) is defined in s. 371(1). It is submitted, however, that this definition
gives it no specialized meaning, but rather that it codifies those principles of
criminal responsibility to which reference has been made.
18 Under s. 371(1), "wilfully", as defined therein, is to apply to all the
offences in ss. 372-390, i.e. Part IX of the Criminal Code.
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The British Columbia Court of Appeal considered that s. 371 (1)
involved a more stringent requirement of mens rea. Here, the court
defined "wilfully" as an act done by the accused "deliberately, as a
free agent, and in the exercise of his own will".19 This interpretation
of wilfully narrows the range of conduct covered by s. 371(1), and
adopts a meaning that is more in line with the traditional concept
of the guilty mind. However, it includes language such as "free
agent" that is not entirely familiar to the criminal vocabularly,20 and
gives rise to the problem of knowing just how far it is to be extended.
In R. v. McHugh,21 cited by the court, the ordinary meaning of "wil-
fully" is said to be extended by s. 371(1), but in defining the limits
of this extension it is stipulated that the accused must be acting as a
free agent.22 This qualification had previously been adopted in Rex
v. Goodman,2 another case involving an offence under Part IX but
which was not mentioned by the court. In neither of these cases
does it become clear whether the accused must simply be a free
agent in the physical sense, or whether the courts would have been
prepared to extend this requirement to his mental condition as well.
This might be a possibility, although a rather unlikely explanation in
light of the common usage of the term free agent.
The Court of Appeal seems bent on interpreting "wilfully" as
far as possible in its ordinary sense.24 For example, emphasis on the
"deliberateness" of the accused's conduct, and his ability to be the
master of his own will indicate a certain pre-occupation with the
accused's purpose and determination. The problem with such an
interpretation is that it involves considerable strain on the language
in s. 371(1). It is difficult to see how purpose or motive can play
any part in whether or not conduct is "wilful", when the only
requirement seems to be that the accused know his activity will pro-
bably cause damage.
One further point should be mentioned before leaving this aspect
of the case-the effect of "reckless" in the language of s. 371 (1).
The Supreme Court made no reference to it in their discussion of
s. 371 (1), making it difficult to assess the relevance of recklessness
in defining what constitutes wilful conduct. Possibly it is of no signi-
ficance at all, or the court would have considered it necessary to
mention it in their judgment.
However, this latter conclusion seems unlikely, and it becomes
necessary to discover what meaning has been adopted for the word
"reckless". It is quite possible that the Supreme Court regarded
recklessness as an alternative to having knowledge that certain con-
duct would probably cause damage. To prove that an individual's
conduct is "wilful", it simply becomes a matter of establishing either
19 Supra, footnote 9 at 73.
20 Norris, J.A., in giving the Court of Appeal's interpretation of s. 371(1)
cites one of two civil cases that are generally relied upon to support this
propostion-In re Young v. Hartson's Contract, (1886) 31 Ch. D. 168. The
other case is Anderson & Eddy v. C.N.R., (1917) 35 D.L.R. 480.
21 19661 C.C.C. 170 (N.S.S.C.-Appellate Division).
22 Ibid., at 178.
23 99 C.C.C. 366 (B.C.C.A.), at 372.
24 Supra, footnote 16.
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of these conditions, but not both.25 In effect, such an interpretation
of "reckless" involves the substitution of the disjunctive "or" for the
"and" which precedes the stipulation in s. 371(1) that the conduct
be reckless. This interpretation would seem the most likely in light
of the decision in R. v. Carker.
On the other hand, the element of "being reckless" may be one
of two essential ingredients in the definition of "wilful" conduct,2 6
and one which should have been established before the accused was
convicted in the Carker decision. The problem in such an interpreta-
tion of s. 371 (1) is to decide what is meant by "being reckless". One
is again faced with language that is not familiar in a criminal con-
text, and it is difficult to know how rigid a standard should be applied
in determining whether conduct is reckless. However, under any
such standard, it would seem unlikely that the accused's conduct in
R. v. Carker could be considered reckless.
III
Attention until now has been focused upon the court's interpreta-
tion of the offence with which the accused was charged. However,
the decision in R. v. Carker27 is probably more significant for the
manner in which it dealt with the accused's plea of duress, and it is
this aspect of the case that will now be looked at more carefully.
The concept of duress, before being dealt with as the interpreta-
tion of s. 17 and its application to the circumstances in the Carker
decision, should first be examined in terms of its basic components.
In practice duress assumes varied combinations of these different
components, and in each case the result is different. For example,
there is no doubt that actual or threatened compulsion, when it cannot
be avoided, is the basis of duress. But is this compulsion restricted to
threats of physical violence? What is meant by a continuing threat?28
What must be the extent of the threatening? Another element of
duress is the accused's reaction to the threats and the fear which he
experiences. However, is the accused's fear of the threats being carried
out to be assessed on a subjective or objective standard? If the latter,
to what extent will an individual's abnormal characteristics be taken
into account?
25 This would seem to be the suggestion in Rex v. McHugh, [19661 1
C.C.C. 170, where Bisset J., at page 178 says ".... the section (371(1)) does
not restrict the meaning of 'wilful' but extends it to include reckless acts as
well as acts done with a bad motive ... See also R. v. Corliss, (1957) 120
C.C.C. 341.
26 R. v. Entwistle, 47 C.C.C. 121, at 122: "... the damage was caused by
the act of the defendant which he knew would probably cause it, being reck.
less whether such event happened or not." Also, Rex v. Kozalk, 88 C.C.C. 350(B.C.C.A.) where the court refused to find a misdirection to the jury even If
there had been a failure to explain the extended meaning of s. 371(1) (at
that time s. 509), since the element of recklessness was not present.
27 Supra, footnote 2.
28 Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, 1956 1 W.L.R. 965; R. v. Carker,
supra, footnote 2.
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The consequences or effects of a plea of duress have been disputed
on the grounds of whether it constitutes a defence or an excuse.29
For the purposes of Canadian law the problem would seem to remain
unresolved, if indeed it has been recognized at all, because in the
Carker decision the Supreme Court made no more than passing refer-
ence to "common law rules and principles respecting 'duress' as an
excuse or defence". 30 In the same way one should decide whether
duress, once established, negates mens rea and the exercise of an
individual's will,31 or whether it is a defence superimposed upon the
whole concept of criminal liability and separate from motive, will,
or purpose.32
In R. v. Carker, the Supreme Court seem to neglect or be un-
aware of the existence of many of these issues. As has been men-
tioned, the court felt that "the common law rules and principles
respecting 'duress' 33 had been completely supplanted or replaced by
s. 17, to the extent that no defence remained to the accused under
s. 7 of the Criminal Code. Thus, if the questions that have been posed
concerning the general concept of duress are to be answered, they
need only be dealt with in terms of the language in and legislative
intention of s. 17.
Looking at the court's interpretation of s. 17, one is immediately
struck by the narrow scope attributed to the legislation and the
conclusive meaning given individual words and phrases. "Threats of
immediate death or grievous bodily harm" is whittled down to include
only the most imminent danger. For example, the court considers it
"inconceivable" that such threats could have resulted while the
prisoners were locked in their separate cells. One can also draw from
the court's remarks, although it is nowhere stated specifically in the
decision, that "present" within the meaning of s. 17 must involve
more than being confined to a locked cell.
Such an interpretation of s. 17 seems unnecessary in light of
information recorded in the Court of Appeal decision,34 but not men-
tioned in the Supreme Court. As previously described, evidence was
brought of the threats made to the accused during the rioting. How-
ever, there would also have been evidence adduced to support a plea
of duress, had it been allowed, to the effect that such threats had
been carried out in the past in other prisons, and of a particular
incident along these lines in the very prison in which the accused
was incarcerated. Surely circumstances such as these must weigh
upon a court's analysis of what constitutes immediate death or griev-
29 In R. v. Bourne, (1952) 36 Cr. App. Rep. 125, the court considered the
common law defence of duress was no more than a prayer to be excused from
punishment. This opinion was rejected in 69 L.Q.R. 226 by Professor J. L1. 3.
Edwards. See also R. v. teane, [1947] 1 All E.R. 813, at 816.
30 Supra, footnote 2.
31 R. v. Bourne, supra, footnote 29, at 128.
32 Dr. Glanville Williams adopts this latter approach suggesting it is
"better to regard duress as a defence standing altogether outside the defini-
tion of will and act." Wn.Lmvs G., Camm=AL LAw (2nd ed.) at 751.
33 Supra, footnote 2.
34 Supra, footnote 9, at 67.
1967]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
ous bodily harm. How "immediate" in terms of a time element must
the danger be? Suppose there was a real likelihood that following
the rioting the prisoners would be filed into new quarters, or tem-
porarily locked up together, thus allowing the threats to be carried
out on the accused before he could disclose his danger to officials.
Does this not involve sufficient immediacy?
No doubt the court was confronted with legislation that on its
face appears straightforward, although it is perhaps susceptible to
various interpretations. However, the legislation was originally design-
ed around fundamental principles of criminal justice, and, in view of
the paucity of Canadian law in the area,35 the court might have been
well advised to consider these before adopting so rigid an interpre-
tation of the language. The Canadian criminal statute was developed
from two sources36 -the English Draft Code of 1879 and Stephens
Digest of the English Criminal Code. S. 17, in particular, of the
present Code is in almost the exact terms of Article 23 of the Draft
Code, and for this reason the recommendations and comments of the
Commissioners in the report on their Draft Code become most
interesting.
The Commissioners dealt with duress in conjunction with all
circumstances that amount to a justification or excuse for doing
that which would otherwise be a crime.3 7 Duress, in their language,
involved a man's right to preserve his own life and limb, and in
Article 23 they defined duress in terms which they felt represented
the existing law, or what they felt that law should be.3 8 There is
no discussion in the Report of what is meant by immediate death
or grievous bodily harm, but one is struck in reading the examples
of duress in previous cases, 39 cited in the Commissioners' comments,
with the broad range such threats were thought to cover. More im-
portant, however, is the Commissioners' consideration of necessity
as a justification, or defence, for which no provision was made in
the Draft Code. They were not prepared to suggest it might never
be a defence, saying:
... we judge it better to leave such questions to be dealt with when,
if ever, they arise in practice by applying the principles of law to the
circumstances of the particular case."40
This might well have been good therapy to apply in the interpreta-
tion of s. 17, particularly in light of the rather unusual circumstances
that surrounded the Carker case.
35 Section 17 of the Criminal Code has been reviewed in only a few
Canadian decisions: The King v. Faruto, 1912) 10 D.L.R. 669 (Que. C.A.),
Dunbar v. The King, (1936) 67 C.C.C. 20 (S.C.C.). In none of these are the
courts involved with the actual language of section 17, as here, and the cases
are of negligible assistance in determining the issues in R. v. Carker.
36 Rex v. Martin, [1933) 1 D.L.R. 434 (Man. C.A.), at 459; Rex v. Farduto,
supra, footnote 4, at 672.
37 REPORT OF TiE ROYAL CoMvnssIo" APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE LAW
RELATING TO INDICTABLE OFnNCES, C-2345 (1879), at 10.
38 Ibid., at 43.
39 In particular, McGrowther's case, Foster 13, 168 E.R. 8.
40 Supra, footnote 37, at 44.
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It is interesting that the Commissioners, in trying to define the
circumstances which would justify conduct that is ordinarily criminal,
confirmed their faith in the "sense and justice" which underlie the
principles of the common law.41 There can be little doubt that in
those countries where criminal activity is governed by a code the
defence of duress has generally been restricted,42 but just how far
such qualifications are to extend is another question.43
Perhaps this can best be answered by looking at the course
which the common law has followed in defining duress, as it was
presumably these principles of the common law that the Commis-
sioners held in such high esteem. Several cases deal at length with
the various aspects of duress at common law,44 but for our purposes
A.-G. v. Whelan45 is the most important. Here, a bank robber had
taken his loot to the home of the accused, where he threatened the
accused with murder or other serious consequences if the stolen
goods were not kept by the accused and nobody informed of their
whereabouts. The robber then "departed, and was later apprehended.
However, in the interval the accused made no attempt to return the
property or contact the proper authorities, claiming that he continued
to fear possible reprisals by the robber if he made any move in that
direction. In upholding the instructions to the jury46 and quashing
the conviction, the court stipulated that the threats be of immediate
death or serious personal violence and held that in this case "the
finding of the jury meant to imply that the coercion was present when
the act, otherwise criminal, was committed..."47
It would be difficult to distinguish the plight of the accused in
the Whelan decision from that of the accused in the Carker decision.
However, the verdicts are different. How far did the Commissioners,
in drafting Article 23, mean to alter the common law? Even the
language used in A.-G. v. Whelan to define duress corresponds almost
exactly to the wording of the Draft Code and our s. 17, and suggests
the Supreme Court might have adopted another meaning for the
words. If A.-G. v. Whelan represents the "sense and justice" of the
common law, why is it that our s. 17 should be interpreted with so
little attention to the principles of such a decision?
41 Supra, footnote 37, at 10.
42 See WiLL vms, G., CRumTAL LAW (2nd ed.) at 245-6; HowARD C., AUSTRA-
LtAN CnmivTAL LAW.
43 Supra, footnote 37, at 10: "... we do not think it desirable that, if a
particular combination of circumstances arises of so unusual a character
that the law has never been decided with reference to it, there should be any
risk of a Code being so framed as to deprive an accused person of a defence
to which the common law entitles him..."
44 Probably the two most significant decisions in this respect are: R?. v.
Bourne, (1952) 36 Cr. App. Rep. 125; R. v. .Steane, [1947] 1 All E.R. 813. Other
cases are: P.. v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273; R. v. Tyler, 8 C. & P. 616;
R?. v. Crutchley, 5 C. & P. 133; R. v. Stratton, 21 How St. Tr. 1045; MacGrow-
ther's case, Fost. 13.
45 [1934) Ir. R. 518 (Court of Criminal Appeal).46 The language used in these instructions was: "In receiving the money
did the accused act under threat of immediate death or immediate serious
violence?"
47 Supra, footnote 45, at 526.
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Finally, before leaving the Supreme Court's interpretation of
duress in s. 17 it might be wise to consider the Court of Appeal's
solution. Norris, J.A. took as his focal point the accused's belief in
whether or not the threats would be carried out.48 In trying to deter-
mine whether such fear existed in the accused's mind the additional
requirements of s. 17, such as type of threats necessary and the
presence of the person making them, would be applied in varying
degrees of rigidity. Although this analysis of the legislation does not
answer all the questions that were originally proposed concerning
the general concept of duress, it would seem to correspond much
more closely than the Supreme Court's interpretation of s. 17 to
the common law approach and to fundamental principles of criminal
responsibility.
IV
Following the Carker decision, courts will be tied down to a very
narrow path in applying the defense of duress. The Supreme Court
has insisted upon a most restrictive interpretation of the language
of s. 17, and would seem to have prevented any future extension of
the concept of duress by refusing to recognize its existence outside
the terms of the Criminal Code. This is the more unfortunate in view
of the Supreme Court's less rigid approach in a similar, although
entirely separate, area of the Code--the defence of insanity.
In More v. Queen,49 a murderer, suffering from depressive psy-
chosis which impaired his ability to make decisions in a normal kind
of way, did not plead insanity. However, the accused did bring evi-
dence of his peculiar mental state, and the court had to decide
whether this impairment of the accused's ability to reason or decide,
notwithstanding his sanity by the standards of s. 16,50 would provide
a defence to the charge that the killing was "planned and deliberate".
The majority of the court 51 held that it was a good defence. They
contended that the decision as to whether the accused's conduct is
his deliberate act involves "an inquiry as to the thinking of the
accused at the moment of acting".52 Such an inquiry would include
consideration, in this case, of the accused's abnormal mental attitude.
The majority insisted that this in no way effected the interpretation
or application of s. 16. However, Fauteux J., in the dissenting judg-
ment, disagreed with the majority's treatment of "planning and
deliberation" and s. 16. Referring to the latter, he said it was "all
embracing with respect to the question of insanity in criminal mat-
ters".53 Recognizing that the irrationality of the accused's planning
or deliberation might suggest "a degree of mental irresponsibility
legally apt to relieve from legal responsibility", 54 Fauteux J. qualified
48 Supra, footnote 9, at 74.
49 [1963] S.C.R. 522.
50 Criminal Code, 1953-54 S.C., c. 51, s. 16.
51 Cartwright, Abbott, Judson, Ritchie, and Hall JJ.
52 Supra, footnote 49, at 534.
53 Ibid., at 531.
54 Ibid.
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this by saying that impairment of mental capacity short of insanity
was not a defence to the crime charged, nor would it ever be until it
fell within the language of s. 16.
In applying the reasoning of the court in the More case to the
defence of duress, one must be aware that the concept of duress can be
approached either as a negation of the mens rea necessary to con-
stitute an offence or as a defence superimposed upon the structure
of criminal conduct. In the latter case it simply becomes necessary
to bring the accused's conduct within stipulated conditions of threats
and fear to allow a successful plea. The problem of which explanation
is the more satisfactory approach to duress has been mentioned
already,5 5 without coming to a conclusion. Nor is it intended that
the answer should be provided here. Rather, each approach will be
discussed in light of More.
If one adopts the idea that duress negates mens rea, and in this
way eliminates criminal liability for particular conduct,5 6 the majority
decision in More provides an interesting analogy. There, the accused's
inability to arrive at a decision in an ordinary and rational manner
was considered relevant in deciding whether he had the requisite
mens rea to commit the offence, despite the fact that the accused's
irrational conduct could not be brought within section 16. In Carker,
surely evidence that might indicate the accused was not acting "wil-
fully", but rather under compulsion, should be admissible as going
to the mens rea required by s. 371 (1), despite the fact that it is not
properly admissible under s. 17?
On the other hand, if one accepts the proposition that duress
as a defence stands outside and apart from the ingredients of criminal
responsibility,57 the dissenting judgment of Fauteux J. in More is
probably more significant. There it is suggested that the majority
has in effect recognized a defence of insanity that exists outside the
language of s. 16. Applied to duress, this would allow the recognition
of circumstances outside s. 17 that amount to duress. A court, without
offending the language of s. 17, could accept as a defence circum-
stances which at common law would be recognized as duress, but
which did not comply with the standards of s. 17. This, surely, was
the situation in R?. v. Carker.
V
In conclusion, one can do no more than mourn the Supreme
Court's refusal to give to the language of s. 17 a broader and more
flexible meaning. Duress would now seem to be shackled by require-
ments that involve the most obvious but less likely forms of com-
pulsion, without recognizing the more subtle forces by which men
are compelled to betray their own will. The solution, at this stage,
would seem to be new legislation which not only recognizes the more
55 Infra.
56 A.-G. v. WheZan, supra, footnote 45. R?. v. Bourne, supra, footnote 44.
57 Supra, footnote 32.
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